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Introduction 
 
The war in South Ossetia was entirely predictable and indeed over-predicted – and still 
took every major actor, including Russia, by surprise. The guns of August shattered the 
status quo that had survived the ‘Rose Revolution’ in Georgia in November 2003, a 
couple of electoral crises in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and indeed the two Chechen wars. 
Now the US has to assess the risks of renewing military ties with Georgia, the EU needs 
to hammer out a strategy of meaningful engagement with the South Caucasus – and 
Russia is taking stock of new strengths and weaknesses of its position, perhaps 
discovering that the spoils that duly go to the victor are mostly damaged goods. 
 
The war have changed many intricate Caucasian interplays but it has resolved nothing as 
the status problem of South Ossetia and Abkhazia remains open, and the deep 
‘ideological’ conflict between the Putin/Medvedev regime and the Saakashvili regime 
continues to generate tension. This analysis will not go into the impact of the war on 
Russia’s political evolution, but will concentrate on the shifts in competing energy 
policies in the Caspian area, on the emerging new role of the power factor in the 
Caucasus, and on Russia’s changing guidelines for Iran, Turkey and the Middle East.  
 
The pipelines are safe but the energy business is slow 
 
The new Russian Foreign Policy Concept approved in July 2008 says next to nothing 
about energy but in fact the main focus of the foreign policy efforts in the Caspian area in 
the last few years has been on increasing Russia’s access to the hydrocarbon production 
and control over their transportation. It is remarkable in this context that the clash with 
Georgia had very little direct impact on the flow of Caspian oil and gas to the world 
markets. Having a perfect opportunity to destroy the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) 
pipeline, which is a symbol of Western engagement with the region, Moscow refrained 
from any sabotage.2 The signal to the Western oil ‘majors’ as well as the governments 
was clear: The energy business is too serious to expose it to the risks of local wars. 
 
Russia quite possibly has achieved more in the mid-term oil-&-gas manoeuvring by 
demonstrating restraint than it would have by temporarily choking the Georgian 
‘corridor’. Now it can swiftly redouble the efforts at opening a new oil channel out of the 
Black Sea – the Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline by-passing the Bosporus – that would 
take the bulk of the Kashagan production in Kazakhstan. It can also advance the South 
Stream project from Novorossiisk to Varna for delivering to Europe new Caspian gas, 
including from Azerbaijan, which has received very tempting offers from Gazprom. 
These reliable routes would seriously diminish Georgia’s importance (while greatly 
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increasing Bulgaria’s profile), particularly since its attractiveness for investment has been 
seriously compromised. 
 
The problem with this Russian energy policy that connects perfectly with the growing 
‘energy nationalism’ of Caspian petro-states is that the development of hydrocarbon 
resources noticeably slows down. Russia’s own oil and gas sectors have reached a 
plateau, and the delays with drilling in the Northern Caspian fields add to this trend. 
Kazakhstan increases pressure on the Western companies developing Tengiz and 
Kashagan, demanding greater share of profits, and Azerbaijan might open for revisions 
the production-sharing agreements from the 1990s. Turkmenistan keeps promising plenty 
of gas to every suitor but has signed only one contract for developing ‘green fields’ – 
with China. The producers share the perception that there is no need to rush the extraction 
since the value of their resources is only going to appreciate. That could create a situation 
when Russia’s transport capacity would exceed the amount of product, so Moscow would 
be able to bargain down the transit costs – and put pressure on Georgia and Ukraine. 
 
Temptations for Russia in the power-play in the Caucasus 
 
The war has inevitably brought the power factor to the forefront of political interactions 
in the Caucasus, and that gives Russia a distinct advantage over the US, while the 
European ‘soft power’ might take years to reassert its relevance.3 It was back in the early 
1990s that Russia was able to establish dominance in conflict management relying on its 
military power, but since then diplomacy of international organizations and activities of 
various international NGOs, the inflow of Western investments and the revival of tourism 
have transformed and ‘softened’ the nature of Caucasian politics.  
 
Russia became a status-quo power, in no small degree due to the burden of the second 
Chechen war and the profound destabilization of the North Caucasus that required a 
sustained ‘counter-terrorist operation’. The situation has started to change since mid-2006 
as Ramzan Kadyrov consolidated his control over Chechnya, and during 2007 
insurgencies in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria lost their drive. Moscow in the 
meanwhile continued to build up military muscle deploying new mountain brigades in the 
North Caucasus and increasing combat training. For the first time since 1994, Russia had 
available combat capabilities – sufficient for defeating the poorly-led Georgian army. 
  
Russian losses were minimal and no burdensome tasks in securing the de-facto 
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been added, so Moscow would 
continue to enjoy the ability to project irresistible power across the Caucasus in the near 
future. Georgia would remain the most immediate subject for this pressure, and its plans 
for rebuilding its army with Western help involve considerable risks. NATO might feel 
obliged to grant Georgia the Membership Action Plan (MAP) but the Alliance has to 
evaluate the possibility that a next clash might involve a ‘candidate’ country – and in the 
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not too distant future, a member-state. The reality of preponderate and hostile Russian 
power will be acutely felt in Georgia and might stimulate a rise of secessionism, 
particularly in Ajaria and Armenian-populated Javakheti.  
 
Azerbaijan, which refrained from expressing any support to Georgia in the conflict with 
Russia, will also have to take into account the reality of Moscow’s new readiness to 
exploit its heavy-impact military instruments. That might discourage Baku from pursuing 
the intention to ‘buy’ itself an army capable of winning back the lost territories and 
perhaps even the Nagorno Karabakh, which is tightly integrated with Armenia.4 Russia’s 
demonstrated dominance could also discourage Azerbaijan’s pro-Western orientation, 
particularly since there is a perfect political compatibility between Ilham Aliyev’s and 
Putin-Medvedev’s ‘enlightened authoritarian’ regimes.    
 
Maintaining the position of power in the Caucasus might require more flexible 
instruments than tanks, and Moscow would probably add a few more vessels to the 
Caspian Flotilla, which is able to show flag right next to the oil and gas-fields disputed by 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan – and to make sure that a trans-Caspian pipeline never 
becomes a practical proposition. It might, however, be far more difficult to upgrade the 
Black Sea Fleet, which was quite active during the war with Georgia – and thus possibly 
sealed its future. Ukraine – whatever turns its domestic politics might take – will insist on 
withdrawing the Russian naval base from Sevastopol by 2017, and building a new one in 
Novorossiisk is a hugely complicated task, not least because of the sprawling oil 
terminals. A usable naval superiority in the Black Sea and occasional Mediterranean 
tours might become unsustainable. 
 
Intrigues or interests in the Middle East? 
 
The visits to Moscow of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Syrian 
President Bashar al-Assad in the days when Russian tanks stood just outside Tbilisi 
demonstrated that the resonance of the war did spread southwards. Moscow is keen to 
exploit its strengthened positions in the Caucasus for boosting influence in its immediate 
neighbourhood – Iran and Turkey – as well as in the Middle East. This influence is based 
not on Russia’s reconstituted military strength but on the fact that it inflicted a humiliated 
defeat to a US ally and then brushed off the idle threats from Washington. 
 
Turkey is certainly a NATO member and is bound by Atlantic solidarity; its rift with the 
US, however, caused by the war in Iraq, goes deep and determines a different approach to 
relations with Russia. Turkey had provided assistance in reforming the Georgian army 
prior to the war, but in principle it is more interested in building ties with Turkic-
speaking countries, first of all Azerbaijan. Russia showed sensitivity to Ankara’s 
concerns and refrained from any airstrikes or naval operation against Batumi, the 
Georgian port close to the Turkish border. Economic ties between the two states have 
evolved from semi-legal ‘shuttle trade’ to massive mutual investments, but as far as 
energy is concerned, Moscow now seeks to avoid transit through Turkey, much to 
Anakara’s chagrin. The key security problem for the near term could be not the lifting of 
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Turkish blockade of Armenia but the recognition of Abkhazia’s independence, which 
Ankara might be convinced to consider in exchange for Russia’s support on the Cyprus 
problem and on Turkey’s possible moves into Northern Iraq. 
 
Russia’s course towards Iran has been highly ambivalent as the goals of cultivating 
‘good-neighbour’ ties and of contributing to Western efforts aimed at terminating the 
Iranian nuclear program have worked strictly cross-purpose. The sharp deterioration of 
relations with the US caused by the war with Georgia will quite possibly prompt Russia 
to curtail the cooperation in non-proliferation and thus increase the emphasis on 
rapprochement with Iran. Moscow would certainly prefer to see the controversial nuclear 
program to remain strictly civilian, but a nuclear-armed Iran would hardly pose a greater 
security risk than Pakistan, and the Russian leadership is prepared to accept such a 
prospect.5 The export of conventional arms to Iran might increase, but the key question 
will be about Gazprom’s involvement in developing huge gas-fields in Iran, since Tehran 
is interested in exporting its gas to Europe – and Gazprom could have different ideas.       
 
As for the Middle East, Russia has been cautiously opportunistic seeking to maximize the 
advantages of its uniquely impartial role of a party that is able to talk with both Israel and 
Iran and even with ‘untouchables’ like Hamas and Hizballah. Moscow is showing little 
of the Soviet ‘generosity’ even to ‘old friends’ like Syria and agrees on cancelling bad 
debts in exchange for strictly commercial terms in new contracts. Its particular attention 
to Algeria and Libya is not quite reciprocated, as both states aim at expanding their ties 
with Europe. Playing with the idea of a ‘gas OPEC’, Russia is not keen to further 
cooperation with the real OPEC, preferring the position of a ‘free rider’. Besides arms 
markets, Russia is very interested in the plans for building nuclear reactors that are 
contemplated by many Arab states – but here its nuclear cooperation with Iran is not 
necessarily an advantage. Taking a defiant stance against the US, Moscow might have 
scored a few points with the Arab ‘street’ but the governments have a good measure of 
the limits of Russia’s engagement.   
 
Conclusions 
 
In the aftermath of the Caucasian war, the US expressed an intention to ‘punish’ Russia 
and NATO declared that there would be ‘no business as usual’, but the net result of these 
tough words was a greater failure of Western policy towards Russia. In the Caucasus, 
Moscow now has every reason to believe that no effective containment of its power 
projection could be mastered. The states of the region, including the traumatized Georgia, 
will have to adjust to the new reality of Russia’s dominance and find ways to 
accommodate the obstinate quasi-state actors. As new channels for transporting the 
Caspian energy would open towards Russia and China, the geopolitical importance of the 
Caucasus might decline, but for Moscow this region will continue to be of vital 
importance. Russia now has the ability to supplement its military might with economic 
strength and to put into play some other elements of ‘soft power’, so it is only the 
arrogance of supremacy that might derail its post-imperialist magnification. 
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